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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission
16-111
Ruling Below: Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo.App., 2015)
Cake shop and its owner sought review of the Civil Rights Commission's decision and issuance
of cease and desist order, requiring shop and owner not to discriminate against potential
customers because of their sexual orientation, in same-sex couple's action against shop and
owner for discrimination based on sexual orientation under Anti-Discrimination Act, stemming
from shop's refusal to sell couple wedding cake. The Colorado Court of Appeals, Taubman, J.,
affirmed, holding that: as a matter of first impression, adding owner as respondent to couple's
formal complaint was permissible under relation back doctrine; owner's refusal to create cake for
couple violated public accommodation provision of Act; cease and desist order did not compel
shop to express celebratory message about same-sex marriage in violation of right to free speech;
Act was neutral law of general applicability, and thus needed only to be rationally related to
legitimate governmental interest to survive challenge under Free Exercise Clause; Free Exercise
Clause of state constitution did not require neutral laws of general applicability to be reviewed
under heightened, strict scrutiny; Act's proscription of sexual orientation discrimination by
places of public accommodation was rationally related to state's interest in eliminating
discrimination; and cease and desist order did not exceed scope of Commission's authority.
Question Presented: Whether applying Colorado's public accommodations law to compel the
petitioner to create expression that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage
violates the free speech or free exercise clauses of the First Amendment.

Charlie CRAIG and David Mullins, Petitioners–Appellees,
v.
MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, INC., and any successor entity, and Jack C. Phillips,
Respondents–Appellants,
and
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, Appellee.
Colorado Court of Appeals
Decided on August 13, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN
This case juxtaposes the rights of
complainants, Charlie Craig and David
Mullins,
under
Colorado's
public
accommodations law to obtain a wedding
cake to celebrate their same-sex marriage

against the rights of respondents,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., and its owner,
Jack C. Phillips, who contend that requiring
them to provide such a wedding cake violates
their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech and the free exercise of religion.
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This appeal arises from an administrative
decision by appellee, the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission (Commission), which
upheld the decision of an administrative law
judge (ALJ), who ruled in favor of Craig and
Mullins and against Masterpiece and Phillips
on cross-motions for summary judgment. For
the reasons discussed below, we affirm the
Commission's decision.

Craig and Mullins later filed charges of
discrimination with the Colorado Civil
Rights Division (Division), alleging
discrimination based on sexual orientation
under the Colorado Anti–Discrimination Act
(CADA), §§ 24–34–301 to –804,
C.R.S.2014. After an investigation, the
Division issued a notice of determination
finding probable cause to credit the
allegations of discrimination. Craig and
Mullins then filed a formal complaint with
the Office of Administrative Courts alleging
that Masterpiece had discriminated against
them in a place of public accommodation
because of their sexual orientation in
violation
of
section
24–34–601(2),
C.R.S.2014.

I. Background
In July 2012, Craig and Mullins visited
Masterpiece, a bakery in Lakewood,
Colorado, and requested that Phillips design
and create a cake to celebrate their same-sex
wedding. Phillips declined, telling them that
he does not create wedding cakes for samesex weddings because of his religious beliefs,
but advising Craig and Mullins that he would
be happy to make and sell them any other
baked goods. Craig and Mullins promptly left
Masterpiece without discussing with Phillips
any details of their wedding cake. The
following day, Craig's mother, Deborah
Munn, called Phillips, who advised her that
Masterpiece did not make wedding cakes for
same-sex weddings because of his religious
beliefs and because Colorado did not
recognize same-sex marriages.

The parties did not dispute any material facts.
Masterpiece and Phillips admitted that the
bakery is a place of public accommodation
and that they refused to sell Craig and
Mullins a cake because of their intent to
engage in a same-sex marriage ceremony.
After the parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment, the ALJ issued a lengthy
written order finding in favor of Craig and
Mullins.
The ALJ's order was affirmed by the
Commission. The Commission's final cease
and desist order required that Masterpiece (1)
take
remedial
measures,
including
comprehensive staff training and alteration to
the company's policies to ensure compliance
with CADA; and (2) file quarterly
compliance reports for two years with the
Division describing the remedial measures
taken to comply with CADA and
documenting all patrons who are denied
service and the reasons for the denial.
Masterpiece and Phillips now appeal the
Commission's order.

The ALJ found that Phillips has been a
Christian for approximately thirty-five years
and believes in Jesus Christ as his Lord and
savior. Phillips believes that decorating cakes
is a form of art, that he can honor God
through his artistic talents, and that he would
displease God by creating cakes for same-sex
marriages.
Craig and Mullins had planned to marry in
Massachusetts, where same-sex marriages
were legal, and later celebrate with friends in
Colorado, which at that time did not
recognize same-sex marriages.

II. Motion to Dismiss
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At the outset, Phillips and Masterpiece
contend that the ALJ and the Commission
erred in denying two motions to dismiss
which they filed pursuant to C.R.C.P.
12(b)(1), (2), and (5). We disagree.

C.R.C.P. 15(c), which is nearly identical to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(C), contains three
requirements which, if met, allow for a claim
in an amended complaint against a new party
to relate back to the filing of the original: (1)
the claim must have arisen out of the same
transaction or conduct set forth in the original
complaint; (2) the new party must have
received notice of the action within the period
provided by law for commencing the action;
and (3) the new party must have known or
reasonably should have known that, “but for
a mistake concerning the identity of the
proper party, the action would have been
brought against him.” “Many courts have
liberally construed to find that amendments
simply adding or dropping parties, as well as
amendments that actually substitute
defendants, fall within the ambit of the rule.”
Courts interpreting Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(C)
have concluded that the pertinent question
when amending any claim to add a new party
is whether the party to be added, when
viewed from the standpoint of a reasonably
prudent person, should have expected that the
original complaint might be altered to add the
new party.

A. Standard of Review
We review the ALJ's ruling on a C.R.C.P.
12(b) motion to dismiss de novo.
B. First Motion to Dismiss—Lack of
Jurisdiction Over Phillips
Phillips filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
C.R.C.P. 12(b) alleging that the Commission
lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the charges
against him.
Specifically, he claimed that it lacked
jurisdiction because Mullins named only
“Masterpiece Cakeshop,” and not Phillips
personally, as the respondent in the initial
charge of discrimination filed with the
Commission.
The ALJ, applying the relation back doctrine
of C.R.C.P. 15(c), denied the motion. He
concluded that adding Phillips as a
respondent to the formal complaint was
permissible for several reasons. First, he
noted that both the charge of discrimination
and the formal complaint alleged identical
conduct. He further noted that Phillips was
aware from the beginning of the litigation
that he was the person whose conduct was at
issue. Finally, the ALJ found that Phillips
should have known that, but for Mullins'
oversight in not naming Phillips, he would
have been named as a respondent in the
charge of discrimination. We agree with the
ALJ.
Although no Colorado appellate court has
previously addressed this issue, we conclude
that the omission of a party's name from a
CADA charging document should be
considered under the relation back doctrine.

Here, the ALJ properly found that the three
requirements for application of the relation
back doctrine were satisfied. First, the claim
against Phillips arose out of the same
transaction as the original complaint against
Masterpiece. Second, Phillips received
timely notice of the original charge filed
against Masterpiece. Indeed, he responded to
it on behalf of Masterpiece. Third, Phillips
knew or reasonably should have known that
the original complaint should have named
him as a respondent. The charging document
frequently referred to Phillips by name and
identified him as the owner of Masterpiece
Cakeshop and the person who told Craig and
Mullins that his standard business practice
was to refuse to make wedding cakes for
same-sex weddings. Consequently, Phillips
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suffered no prejudice from not being named
in the original complaint.

The charge of discrimination and the notice
of determination correctly referenced section
24–34–601, the public accommodations
section of CADA, several times. Further, the
director's designee who drafted the notice of
determination with the incorrect citation
signed an affidavit explaining that the
reference to section 24–34–402 was a
typographical error, and that the reference
should have been to section 24–34–601.
Because Masterpiece and Phillips could not
have been misled about the legal basis for the
Commission's findings, we perceive no error
in the Commission's refusal to dismiss the
charges against Masterpiece and Phillips
because of a typographical error.

Based on these findings, we conclude that the
ALJ did not err in applying C.R.C.P. 15(c)'s
“relation back” rule. Accordingly, we
conclude that the ALJ did not err when he
denied Phillips' motion to dismiss.
C. Second Motion to Dismiss—Public
Accommodation Charges
Phillips and Masterpiece jointly filed the
second motion to dismiss. They alleged that
the Commission lacked jurisdiction and
failed to state a claim in its notice of
determination as required by section 24–34–
306(2)(b)(II), C.R.S.2014. We disagree.
Section 24–34–306(2)(b)(II) provides: “If the
director or the director's designee determines
that probable cause exists, the director or the
director's designee shall serve the respondent
with written notice stating with specificity
the legal authority and jurisdiction of the
commission and the matters of fact and law
asserted.”

Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ did
not err when he denied Phillips' and
Masterpiece's second motion to dismiss.
III. CADA Violation
Masterpiece contends that the ALJ erred in
concluding that its refusal to create a wedding
cake for Craig and Mullins was “because of”
their sexual orientation. Specifically,
Masterpiece asserts that its refusal to create
the cake was “because of” its opposition to
same-sex marriage, not because of its
opposition to their sexual orientation. We
conclude that the act of same-sex marriage is
closely correlated to Craig's and Mullins'
sexual orientation, and therefore, the ALJ did
not err when he found that Masterpiece's
refusal to create a wedding cake for Craig and
Mullins was “because of” their sexual
orientation, in violation of CADA.

The Division's letter of probable cause
determination erroneously referenced section
24–34–402, C.R.S.2014, the employment
practices section of CADA, and not section
24–34–601(2), the public accommodations
section under which Craig and Mullins filed
their complaint. According to Phillips and
Masterpiece, this erroneous citation violated
section 24–34–306(2)(b)(II)'s requirement
that respondents be notified “with
specificity” of the “legal authority and
jurisdiction of the commission.”
The ALJ denied the second motion to
dismiss. He concluded that Masterpiece and
Phillips could not have been misled by the
error, because “[t]here is no dispute that this
case does not involve either an allegation or
evidence of discriminatory employment
practices.” Again, we agree with the ALJ.

A. Standard of Review
Whether Masterpiece violated CADA is a
question of law reviewed de novo.
B. Applicable Law
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“because of” their sexual orientation. It
argues that it does not object to or refuse to
serve patrons because of their sexual
orientation, and that it assured Craig and
Mullins that it would design and create any
other bakery product for them, just not a
wedding cake. Masterpiece asserts that its
decision was solely “because of” Craig's and
Mullins' intended conduct—entering into
marriage with a same-sex partner—and the
celebratory message about same-sex
marriage that baking a wedding cake would
convey. Therefore, because its refusal to
serve Craig and Mullins was not “because of”
their sexual orientation, Masterpiece
contends that it did not violate CADA. We
disagree.

Section 24–34–601(2)(a), C.R.S.2014, reads,
as relevant here:
It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful
for a person, directly or indirectly, to refuse,
withhold from, or deny to an individual or a
group, because of ... sexual orientation ... the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of a place of public
accommodation....
In Tesmer v. Colorado High School
Activities Association, 140 P.3d 249, 254
(Colo.App.2006), a division of this court
concluded that to prevail on a discrimination
claim under CADA, plaintiffs must prove
that, “but for” their membership in an
enumerated class, they would not have been
denied the full privileges of a place of public
accommodation. The division explained that
plaintiffs need not establish that their
membership in the enumerated class was the
“sole” cause of the denial of services. Id.
Rather, it is sufficient that they show that the
discriminatory action was based in whole or
in part on their membership in the protected
class.

Masterpiece argues that the ALJ made two
incorrect presumptions. First, it contends that
the ALJ incorrectly presumed that opposing
same-sex marriage is tantamount to opposing
the rights of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to
the
equal
enjoyment
of
public
accommodations. Second, it contends that the
ALJ incorrectly presumed that only gay,
lesbian, and bisexual couples engage in
same-sex marriage.

Further, a “place of public accommodation”
is “any place of business engaged in any sales
to the public and any place offering services,
facilities,
privileges,
advantages,
or
accommodations to the public, including but
not limited to any business offering
wholesale or retail sales to the public.”
Finally, CADA defines “sexual orientation”
as “an individual's orientation toward
heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality,
or transgender status or another individual's
perception thereof.”

Masterpiece thus distinguishes between
discrimination based on a person's status and
discrimination based on conduct closely
correlated with that status. However, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized
that such distinctions are generally
inappropriate.
Further, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the
Supreme Court equated laws precluding
same-sex marriage to discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. The Court stated:
“The nature of marriage is that, through its
enduring bond, two persons together can find
other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy,
and spirituality. This is true for all persons,
whatever their sexual orientation.” “Were the

C. Analysis
Masterpiece asserts that it did not decline to
make Craig's and Mullins' wedding cake
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Court to stay its hand ... it still would deny
gays and lesbians many rights and
responsibilities intertwined with marriage.”

against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.
Masterpiece's reliance on Bray is misplaced.
Bray considered whether the defendants,
several organizations that coordinated
antiabortion demonstrations, could be subject
to tort liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1988). Established precedent required that
plaintiffs in section 1985(3) actions prove
that “some ... class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus [lay] behind the
[defendant's] actions.” However, CADA
requires no such showing of “animus.”

In these decisions, the Supreme Court
recognized that, in some cases, conduct
cannot be divorced from status. This is so
when the conduct is so closely correlated
with the status that it is engaged in
exclusively or predominantly by persons who
have that particular status. We conclude that
the act of same-sex marriage constitutes such
conduct because it is “engaged in exclusively
or predominantly” by gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals.
Masterpiece's
distinction,
therefore, is one without a difference. But for
their sexual orientation, Craig and Mullins
would not have sought to enter into a samesex marriage, and but for their intent to do so,
Masterpiece would not have denied them its
services.

Further, Masterpiece admits that it refused to
serve Craig and Mullins “because of” its
opposition to persons entering into same-sex
marriages, conduct which we conclude is
closely correlated with sexual orientation.
Therefore, even if we assume that CADA
requires plaintiffs to establish an intent to
discriminate, as in section 1985(3) action, the
ALJ reasonably could have inferred from
Masterpiece's conduct an intent to
discriminate against Craig and Mullins
“because of” their sexual orientation.

In Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, the
New Mexico Supreme Court rejected a
similar argument raised by a wedding
photographer. The court concluded that by
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual
orientation,
New
Mexico's
antidiscrimination law similarly protects
“conduct that is inextricably tied to sexual
orientation,” including the act of same-sex
marriage. The court observed that
“[o]therwise, we would interpret [the New
Mexico public accommodations law] as
protecting same-gender couples against
discriminatory treatment, but only to the
extent that they do not openly display their
same-gender sexual orientation.” We agree
with the reasoning of the New Mexico
Supreme Court.
Masterpiece relies on Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, which declined to
equate opposition to voluntary abortion with
discrimination against women. As in Bray, it
asks us to decline to equate opposition to
same-sex marriage with discrimination

We also note that although the Bray Court
held that opposition to voluntary abortion did
not equate to discrimination against women,
it observed that “[s]ome activities may be
such an irrational object of disfavor that, if
they are targeted, and if they also happen to
be engaged in exclusively or predominantly
by a particular class of people, an intent to
disfavor that class can readily be presumed.”
The Court provided, by way of example, that
“[a] tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on
Jews.” Likewise, discrimination on the basis
of one's opposition to same-sex marriage is
discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.
We reject Masterpiece's related argument that
its willingness to sell birthday cakes, cookies,
and other non-wedding cake products to gay
and lesbian customers establishes that it did
23

not violate CADA. Masterpiece's potential
compliance with CADA in this respect does
not permit it to refuse services to Craig and
Mullins that it otherwise offers to the general
public.

violation of the First Amendment by
requiring it to create wedding cakes for samesex weddings. Masterpiece argues that
wedding cakes inherently convey a
celebratory message about marriage and,
therefore,
the
Commission's
order
unconstitutionally compels it to convey a
celebratory message about same-sex
marriage in conflict with its religious beliefs.
We disagree. We conclude that the
Commission's order merely requires that
Masterpiece not discriminate against
potential customers in violation of CADA
and that such conduct, even if compelled by
the government, is not sufficiently expressive
to warrant First Amendment protections.

Finally, Masterpiece argues that the ALJ
wrongly presumed that only same-sex
couples engage in same-sex marriage. In
support, it references the case of two
heterosexual New Zealanders who married in
connection with a radio talk show contest.
However, as the Bray court explained, we do
not distinguish between conduct and status
where the targeted conduct is engaged in
“predominantly by a particular class of
people.” An isolated example of two
heterosexual men marrying does not
persuade us that same-sex marriage is not
predominantly, and almost exclusively,
engaged in by gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.
Therefore, we conclude that the ALJ did not
err by concluding that Masterpiece refused to
create a wedding cake for Craig and Mullins
“because of” their sexual orientation. CADA
prohibits places of public accommodations
from basing their refusal to serve customers
on their sexual orientation, and Masterpiece
violated Colorado's public accommodations
law by refusing to create a wedding cake for
Craig's and Mullins' same-sex wedding
celebration.

A. Standard of Review
Whether
the
Commission's
order
unconstitutionally infringes on Masterpiece's
right to the freedom of expression protected
by the First Amendment is a question of law
that we review de novo.
B. Applicable Law
The First Amendment of the United States
Constitution prohibits laws “abridging the
freedom of speech.” Article II, section 10 of
the Colorado Constitution, which provides
greater protection of free speech than does
the First Amendment provides that “[n]o law
shall be passed impairing the freedom of
speech; every person shall be free to speak,
write or publish whatever he will on any
subject.”

Having concluded that Masterpiece violated
CADA, we next consider whether the
Commission's application of the law under
these circumstances violated Masterpiece's
rights to freedom of speech and free exercise
of religion protected by the United States and
Colorado Constitutions.

The freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment includes the “right to refrain
from speaking” and prohibits the government
from telling people what they must say. This
compelled speech doctrine, on which
Masterpiece relies, was first articulated by
the Supreme Court in West Virginia Board of

IV. Compelled Expressive Conduct and
Symbolic Speech
Masterpiece contends that the Commission's
cease and desist order compels speech in
24

Education v. Barnette, and has been applied
in two lines of cases.

some kernel of expression in almost every
activity a person undertakes,” City of Dallas
v. Stanglin, the Supreme Court has rejected
the view that “conduct can be labeled
‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the
conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”
Rather, First Amendment protections extend
only to conduct that is “inherently
expressive.”

The first line of cases prohibits the
government from requiring that an individual
“speak the government's message.”
These cases establish that the government
cannot “prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion” by forcing individuals to
publicly disseminate its own ideological
message. The government also cannot
require “the dissemination of an ideological
message by displaying it on [an individual's]
private property in a manner and for the
express purpose that it be observed and read
by the public.”

In deciding whether conduct is “inherently
expressive,” we ask whether “ ‘[a]n intent to
convey a particularized message was present,
and [whether] the likelihood was great that
the message would be understood by those
who viewed it.’ ” The message need not be
“narrow,” or “succinctly articulable.” The
Supreme Court has recognized expressive
conduct in several cases.

The second line of compelled speech cases
establishes that the government may not
require an individual “to host or
accommodate another speaker's message.”
For example, in Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo, the Supreme Court
invalidated a Florida law which provided
that, if a local newspaper criticized a
candidate for public office, the candidate
could demand that the newspaper publish his
or her reply to the criticism free of charge.
Similarly, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission of California,
the Supreme Court struck down a California
Public Utilities Commission regulation that
permitted
third-party
intervenors
in
ratemaking proceedings to include messages
in the utility's billing envelopes, which it
distributed to customers. These cases
establish that the government may not
commandeer a private speaker's means of
accessing its audience by requiring that the
speaker disseminate a third-party's message.

However, other decisions have declined to
recognize certain conduct as expressive.
Masterpiece's contentions involve claims of
compelled expressive conduct. In such cases,
the threshold question is whether the
compelled conduct is sufficiently expressive
to trigger First Amendment protections. The
party asserting that conduct is expressive
bears the burden of demonstrating that the
First Amendment applies and the party must
advance more than a mere “plausible
contention” that its conduct is expressive.
Finally, a conclusion that the Commission's
order compels expressive conduct does not
necessarily mean that the order is
unconstitutional. If it does compel such
conduct, the question is then whether the
government has sufficient justification for
regulating the conduct. The Supreme Court
has recognized that “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”

The Supreme Court has also recognized that
some forms of conduct are symbolic speech
and deserve First Amendment protections.
However, because “[i]t is possible to find
25

In other words, the government can regulate
communicative conduct if it has an important
interest unrelated to the suppression of the
message and if the impact on the
communication is no more than necessary to
achieve the government's purpose.

threshold question in cases involving
expressive conduct—or as here, compelled
expressive conduct—is whether the conduct
in question is sufficiently expressive so as to
trigger First Amendment protections.
We begin by identifying the compelled
conduct in question. As noted, the
Commission's
order
requires
that
Masterpiece “cease and desist from
discriminating against [Craig and Mullins]
and other same-sex couples by refusing to
sell them wedding cakes or any product [it]
would sell to heterosexual couples.”
Therefore, the compelled conduct is the
Colorado government's mandate that
Masterpiece comport with CADA by not
basing its decision to serve a potential client,
at least in part, on the client's sexual
orientation. This includes a requirement that
Masterpiece sell wedding cakes to same-sex
couples, but only if it wishes to serve
heterosexual couples in the same manner.

C. Analysis
Masterpiece contends that wedding cakes
inherently communicate a celebratory
message about marriage and that, by forcing
it to make cakes for same-sex weddings, the
Commission's cease and desist order
unconstitutionally compels it to express a
celebratory message about same-sex
marriage that it does not support. We
disagree.
The ALJ rejected Masterpiece's argument
that preparing a wedding cake for same-sex
weddings necessarily involves expressive
conduct. He recognized that baking and
creating a wedding cake involves skill and
artistry, but nonetheless concluded that,
because Phillips refused to prepare a cake for
Craig and Mullins before any discussion of
the cake's design, the ALJ could not
determine whether Craig's and Mullins'
desired wedding cake would constitute
symbolic speech subject to First Amendment
protections.

Next, we ask whether, by comporting with
CADA and ceasing to discriminate against
potential customers on the basis of their
sexual orientation, Masterpiece conveys a
particularized message celebrating same-sex
marriage, and whether the likelihood is great
that a reasonable observer would both
understand the message and attribute that
message to Masterpiece.

Masterpiece argues that the ALJ wrongly
considered whether the “conduct” of creating
a cake is expressive, and not whether the
product of that conduct, the wedding cake
itself, constitutes symbolic expression. It
asserts that the ALJ wrongly employed the
test for expressive conduct instead of that for
compelled speech. However, Masterpiece's
argument mistakenly presumes that the legal
doctrines involving compelled speech and
expressive conduct are mutually exclusive.
As noted, because the First Amendment only
protects conduct that conveys a message, the

We conclude that the act of designing and
selling a wedding cake to all customers free
of discrimination does not convey a
celebratory message about same-sex
weddings likely to be understood by those
who view it. We further conclude that, to the
extent that the public infers from a
Masterpiece wedding cake a message
celebrating same-sex marriage, that message
is more likely to be attributed to the customer
than to Masterpiece.
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First, Masterpiece does not convey a message
supporting same-sex marriages merely by
abiding by the law and serving its customers
equally. In FAIR, several law schools
challenged a federal law that denied funding
to institutions of higher education that either
prohibit or prevent military recruiters from
accessing their campuses. The law schools
argued that, by forcing them to treat military
and nonmilitary recruiters alike, the law
compelled them to send “the message that
they see nothing wrong with the military's
policies [regarding gays in the military],
when they do.” The Court rejected this
argument, observing that students “can
appreciate the difference between speech a
school sponsors and speech the school
permits because legally required to do so.”

similarly conclude that CADA does not
compel expressive conduct.
We do not suggest that Masterpiece's status
as a for-profit bakery strips it of its First
Amendment speech protections. However,
we must consider the allegedly expressive
conduct within “the context in which it
occurred.” The public recognizes that, as a
for-profit bakery, Masterpiece charges its
customers for its goods and services. The fact
that an entity charges for its goods and
services reduces the likelihood that a
reasonable observer will believe that it
supports the message expressed in its
finished product. Nothing in the record
supports the conclusion that a reasonable
observer would interpret Masterpiece's
providing a wedding cake for a same-sex
couple as an endorsement of same-sex
marriage, rather than a reflection of its desire
to conduct business in accordance with
Colorado's public accommodations law.

As in FAIR, we conclude that, because
CADA prohibits all places of public
accommodation from discriminating against
customers because of their sexual orientation,
it is unlikely that the public would view
Masterpiece's creation of a cake for a samesex wedding celebration as an endorsement
of that conduct. Rather, we conclude that a
reasonable observer would understand that
Masterpiece's compliance with the law is not
a reflection of its own beliefs.

For the same reason, this case also differs
from Hurley, on which Masterpiece relies.
There, the Supreme Court concluded that
Massachusetts' public accommodations
statute could not require parade organizers to
include among the marchers in a St. Patrick's
Day parade a group imparting a message the
organizers did not wish to convey. Central to
the Court's conclusion was the “inherent
expressiveness of marching to make a point,”
and its observation that a “parade's overall
message is distilled from the individual
presentations along the way, and each unit's
expression is perceived by spectators as part
of the whole.” The Court concluded that
spectators would likely attribute each
marcher's message to the parade organizers
as a whole.

The Elane Photography court distinguished
Wooley and Barnette, and similarly
concluded that New Mexico's public
accommodations law did not compel the
photographer to convey any particularized
message, but rather “only mandates that if
Elane Photography operates a business as a
public
accommodation,
it
cannot
discriminate against potential clients based
on their sexual orientation.” It concluded that
“[r]easonable observers are unlikely to
interpret Elane Photography's photographs as
an endorsement of the photographed events.”
We are persuaded by this reasoning and

In contrast, it is unlikely that the public would
understand Masterpiece's sale of wedding
cakes to same-sex couples as endorsing a
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celebratory
marriage.

message

about

same-sex

wedding cake's design or any possible written
inscriptions.

By selling a wedding cake to a same-sex
couple, Masterpiece does not necessarily lead
an observer to conclude that the bakery
supports its customer's conduct. The public
has no way of knowing the reasons
supporting Masterpiece's decision to serve or
decline to serve a same-sex couple. Someone
observing that a commercial bakery created a
wedding cake for a straight couple or that it
did not create one for a gay couple would
have no way of deciphering whether the
bakery's conduct took place because of its
views on same-sex marriage or for some
other reason.

Finally, CADA does not preclude
Masterpiece from expressing its views on
same-sex marriage—including its religious
opposition to it—and the bakery remains free
to disassociate itself from its customers'
viewpoints. We recognize that section 24–
34–601(2)(a)
of
CADA
prohibits
Masterpiece
from
displaying
or
disseminating a notice stating that it will
refuse to provide its services based on a
customer's desire to engage in same-sex
marriage or indicating that those engaging in
same-sex marriage are unwelcome at the
bakery. However, CADA does not prevent
Masterpiece from posting a disclaimer in the
store or on the Internet indicating that the
provision of its services does not constitute
an endorsement or approval of conduct
protected by CADA. Masterpiece could also
post or otherwise disseminate a message
indicating that CADA requires it not to
discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation
and
other
protected
characteristics. Such a message would likely
have the effect of disassociating Masterpiece
from its customers' conduct.

We also find the Supreme Court's holding in
Carrigan instructive. There, the Court
concluded that legislators do not have a
personal, First Amendment right to vote in
the legislative body in which they serve, and
that restrictions on legislators' voting
imposed by a law requiring recusal in
instances of conflicts of interest are not
restrictions on their protected speech. The
Court rejected the argument that the act of
voting was expressive conduct subject to
First Amendment protections. Although the
Court recognized that voting “discloses ...
that the legislator wishes (for whatever
reason) that the proposition on the floor be
adopted,” it “symbolizes nothing” and is not
“an act of communication” because it does
not convey the legislator's reasons for the
vote.

Therefore,
we
conclude
that
the
Commission's order requiring Masterpiece
not to discriminate against potential
customers because of their sexual orientation
does not force it to engage in compelled
expressive conduct in violation of the First
Amendment. Accordingly, because we
conclude that the compelled conduct here is
not expressive, the State need not show that
it has an important interest in enforcing
CADA.

We recognize that a wedding cake, in some
circumstances, may convey a particularized
message celebrating same-sex marriage and,
in such cases, First Amendment speech
protections may be implicated. However, we
need not reach this issue. We note, again, that
Phillips denied Craig's and Mullins' request
without any discussion regarding the

V. First Amendment and Article II,
Section 4—Free Exercise of Religion
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Next, Masterpiece contends that the
Commission's
order
unconstitutionally
infringes on its right to the free exercise of
religion guaranteed by the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution and article
II, section 4 of the Colorado Constitution. We
conclude that CADA is a neutral law of
general applicability and, therefore, offends
neither the First Amendment nor article II,
section 4.

substantial burden on the practice of religion,
and, if so, whether that burden was justified
by a compelling government interest.
In Smith, the Court disavowed Sherbert 's
balancing test and concluded that the Free
Exercise Clause “does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a
valid and neutral law of general applicability
on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).” The Court held
that neutral laws of general applicability need
only be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest in order to survive a
constitutional challenge. As a general rule,
such laws do not offend the Free Exercise
Clause.

A. Standard of Review
Whether
the
Commission's
order
unconstitutionally infringes on Masterpiece's
free exercise rights, protected by the First
Amendment and article II, section 4, is a
question of law that we review de novo.

However, if a law burdens a religious practice
and is not neutral or not generally applicable,
it “must be justified by a compelling
government interest” and must be narrowly
tailored to advance that interest.

B. Applicable Law
The Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment provides: “Congress shall make
no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion].” The First Amendment is binding
on the States through incorporation by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Article II, section 4
of the Colorado Constitution provides: “The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession
and
worship,
without
discrimination, shall forever hereafter be
guaranteed.”

C. Analysis
1. First Amendment Free Exercise
Masterpiece contends that its claim is not
governed by Smith 's rational basis exception
to general strict scrutiny review of free
exercise claims for two reasons: (1) CADA is
not “neutral and generally applicable” and (2)
its claim is a “hybrid” that implicates both its
free exercise and free expression rights.
Again, we disagree.

“The free exercise of religion means, first
and foremost, the right to believe and profess
whatever religious doctrine one desires.”
Free exercise of religion also involves the
“performance of (or abstention from)
physical acts.”
Before the Supreme Court's decision in
Smith, the Court consistently used a
balancing test to determine whether a
challenged government action violated the
Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. That test considered whether
the challenged government action imposed a

First, we address Masterpiece's contention
that CADA is not neutral and not generally
applicable. A law is not neutral “if the object
of a law is to infringe upon or restrict
practices because of their religious
motivation.” A law is not generally
applicable when it imposes burdens on
religiously motivated conduct while
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permitting exceptions for secular conduct or
for favored religions. The Supreme Court has
explained that an improper intent to
discriminate can be inferred where a law is a
“religious gerrymander[ ]” that burdens
religious conduct while exempting similar
secular activity. If a law is either not neutral
or not generally applicable, it “must be
justified by a compelling governmental
interest and must be narrowly tailored to
advance that interest.”

as places that restrict admission to one gender
because of a bona fide relationship to its
services. Second, it argues that the law is not
neutral because it exempts “places
principally used for religious purposes,” but
not Masterpiece.
We conclude that CADA is generally
applicable, notwithstanding its exemptions.
A law need not apply to every individual and
entity to be generally applicable; rather, it is
generally applicable so long as it does not
regulate only religiously motivated conduct.
CADA does not discriminate on the basis of
religion; rather, it exempts certain public
accommodations that are “principally used
for religious purposes.”

The Court has found only one law to be
neither neutral nor generally applicable. In
Church of Lukumi, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance
prohibiting ritual animal sacrifice. The law
applied to any individual or group that “kills,
slaughters, or sacrifices animals for any type
of ritual, regardless of whether or not the
flesh or blood of the animals is to be
consumed.”

In this regard, CADA does not impede the
free exercise of religion. Rather, its
exemption for “places principally used for
religious purposes” reflects an attempt by the
General Assembly to reduce legal burdens on
religious organizations and comport with the
free exercise doctrine. Such exemptions are
commonplace throughout Colorado law, and,
in some cases, are constitutionally mandated.
Further, CADA is generally applicable
because it does not exempt secular conduct
from its reach. In this respect, CADA's
exemption for places that restrict admission
to one gender because of a bona fide
relationship to its services does not
discriminate on the basis of religion. On its
face, it applies equally to religious and
nonreligious conduct, and therefore is
generally applicable.

Considering that the ordinance's terms such
as “sacrifice” and “ritual” could be either
secular or religious, the Court nevertheless
concluded that the law was not neutral
because its purpose was to impede certain
practices of the Santeria religion. The Court
further concluded that the law was not
generally applicable because it exempted the
killing of animals for several secular
purposes, including the killing of animals in
secular slaughterhouses, hunting, fishing,
euthanasia of unwanted animals, and
extermination of pests, as well as the killing
of animals by some religions, including at
kosher slaughterhouses.
a. Neutral Law of General Applicability
Masterpiece contends that, like the law in
Church of Lukumi, CADA is neither neutral
nor generally applicable. First, it argues that
CADA is not generally applicable because it
provides exemptions for “places principally
used for religious purposes” such as
churches, synagogues, and mosques, as well

Second, we conclude that CADA is neutral.
Masterpiece asserts that CADA is not neutral
because, although it exempts “places
primarily used for religious purposes,”
Masterpiece is not exempt. However,
Masterpiece does not contend that its bakery
is primarily used for religious purposes.
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CADA forbids all discrimination based on
sexual orientation regardless of its
motivation. Further, the existence of an
exemption for religious entities undermines
Masterpiece's contention that the law
discriminates against its conduct because of
its religious character.
Finally, we reiterate that CADA does not
compel Masterpiece to support or endorse
any particular religious views. The law
merely
prohibits
Masterpiece
from
discriminating against potential customers on
account of their sexual orientation. As one
court observed in addressing a similar free
exercise challenge to the 1964 Civil Rights
Act:

Next, we address Masterpiece's contention
that its claim is not governed by Smith 's
rational basis standard and that strict scrutiny
review applies because its contention is a
“hybrid” of both free exercise rights and free
expression rights.
In Smith, the Supreme Court distinguished its
holding from earlier cases applying strict
scrutiny to laws infringing free exercise
rights, explaining that the “only decisions in
which we have held that the First
Amendment bars application of a neutral,
generally applicable law to religiously
motivated actions have involved not the Free
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise
Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections.” Masterpiece
argues that this language created an
exception for “hybrid-rights” claims, holding
that a party can still establish a violation of
the Free Exercise Clause, even where the
challenged law is neutral and generally
applicable, by showing that the claim
comprises both the right to free exercise of
religion and an independent constitutional
right.

Undoubtedly defendant ... has a
constitutional right to espouse the religious
beliefs of his own choosing, however, he
does not have the absolute right to exercise
and practice such beliefs in utter disregard of
the clear constitutional rights of other
citizens. This Court refuses to lend credence
or support to his position that he has a
constitutional right to refuse to serve
members of the Negro race in his business
establishment upon the ground that to do so
would violate his sacred religious beliefs.

We note that Colorado's appellate courts have
not applied the “hybrid-rights” exception,
and several decisions have cast doubt on its
validity. Regardless, having concluded above
that the Commission's order does not
implicate
Masterpiece's
freedom
of
expression, even if we assume the “hybridrights” exception exists, it would not apply
here.
Accordingly, we hold that CADA is a neutral
law of general applicability, and does not
offend the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.

Likewise, Masterpiece remains free to
continue espousing its religious beliefs,
including its opposition to same-sex
marriage. However, if it wishes to operate as
a public accommodation and conduct
business within the State of Colorado, CADA
prohibits it from picking and choosing
customers based on their sexual orientation.
Therefore, we conclude that CADA was not
designed to impede religious conduct and
does not impose burdens on religious conduct
not
imposed
on
secular
conduct.
Accordingly, CADA is a neutral law of
general applicability.

2. Article II, Section 4 Free Exercise of
Religion

b. “Hybrid” Rights Claim
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Masterpiece argues that, although neutral
laws of general applicability do not violate
the First Amendment, the Free Exercise
Clause of the Colorado Constitution requires
that we review such laws under heightened,
strict scrutiny. We disagree.

offend the Free Exercise Clause—is not
equally applicable to claims under article II,
section 4, and we reject Masterpiece's
contention that the Colorado Constitution
requires the application of a heightened
scrutiny test.

Masterpiece gives two reasons supporting
this assertion. First, it argues that Colorado
appellate courts uniformly apply strict
scrutiny to laws infringing fundamental
rights. Second, it argues that the Colorado
Constitution provides broader protections for
individual rights than the United States
Constitution.

3. Rational Basis Review
Having concluded that CADA is neutral and
generally applicable, we easily conclude that
it is rationally related to Colorado's interest in
eliminating discrimination in places of public
accommodation. The Supreme Court has
consistently recognized that states have a
compelling interest in eliminating such
discrimination and that statutes like CADA
further that interest.

We recognize that, with regard to some
individual rights, the Colorado Constitution
has been interpreted more broadly than the
United States Constitution, and that we apply
strict scrutiny to many infringements of
fundamental rights. However, the Colorado
Supreme Court has also recognized that
article II, section 4 embodies “the same
values of free exercise and governmental
noninvolvement secured by the religious
clauses of the First Amendment.”

Without
CADA,
businesses
could
discriminate against potential patrons based
on
their
sexual
orientation.
Such
discrimination in places of public
accommodation has measurable adverse
economic effects. CADA creates a hospitable
environment for all consumers by preventing
discrimination on the basis of certain
characteristics, including sexual orientation.
In doing so, it prevents the economic and
social balkanization prevalent when
businesses decide to serve only their own
“kind,” and ensures that the goods and
services provided by public accommodations
are available to all of the state's citizens.

Colorado appellate courts have consistently
analyzed similar free exercise claims under
the
United
States
and
Colorado
Constitutions, and have regularly relied on
federal precedent in interpreting article II,
section 4. Finally, the Colorado Supreme
Court has never indicated that an alternative
analysis should apply.

Therefore, CADA's proscription of sexual
orientation discrimination by places of public
accommodation is a reasonable regulation
that does not offend the Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment and article
II, section 4.

Given the consistency with which article II,
section 4 has been interpreted using First
Amendment case law—and in the absence of
Colorado
Supreme
Court
precedent
suggesting otherwise—we hesitate to depart
from First Amendment precedent in
analyzing Masterpiece's claims. Therefore,
we see no reason why Smith 's holding—that
neutral laws of general applicability do not

VI. Discovery Requests and Protective
Order
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We also disagree with Masterpiece's
contention that the ALJ abused his discretion
by denying it discovery as to the type of
wedding cake Craig and Mullins intended to
order and details of their wedding ceremony.
We agree with the ALJ's conclusion that
these subjects were not relevant in resolving
the essential issues at trial. The only issues
before the ALJ were (1) whether Masterpiece
violated CADA by categorically refusing to
serve Craig and Mullins because of its
opposition to same-sex marriage and, if so,
(2) whether CADA, as applied to
Masterpiece, violated its rights to freedom of
expression and free exercise of religion.
Evidence pertaining to Craig's and Mullins'
wedding ceremony—including the nature of
the cake they served—had no bearing on the
legality of Masterpiece's conduct. The
decision to categorically deny service to
Craig and Mullins was based only on their
request for a wedding cake and Masterpiece's
own beliefs about same-sex marriage.
Because Craig and Mullins never conveyed
any details of their desired cake to
Masterpiece, evidence about their wedding
cake and details of their wedding ceremony
were not relevant.

Masterpiece argues that the Commission
does not have the authority to issue a cease
and desist order applicable to unidentified
parties, but rather, it may only issue orders
with respect to the specific complaint or
alleged discriminatory conduct in each
proceeding. We disagree with Masterpiece's
reading of the statute.
First, individual remedies are “merely
secondary and incidental” to CADA's
primary
purpose
of
eradicating
discriminatory practices.
Further, Masterpiece admitted that its refusal
to provide a wedding cake for Craig and
Mullins was pursuant to the company's policy
to decline orders for wedding cakes for samesex weddings and marriage ceremonies. The
record reflects that Masterpiece refused to
make wedding cakes for several other samesex couples. In this respect, the Commission's
order was aimed at the specific
“discriminatory or unfair practice” involved
in Craig's and Mullins' complaint.
Accordingly, we conclude that the
Commission's cease and desist order did not
exceed the scope of its powers.

Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ did
not abuse his discretion by denying
Masterpiece's requested discovery.

VIII. Conclusion

VII. Commission's Cease and Desist Order

The Commission's order is affirmed.

Finally, we reject Masterpiece's contention
that the Commission's cease and desist order
exceeded the scope of its statutory authority.
Where the Commission finds that CADA has
been violated, section 24–34–306(9)
provides that it “shall issue and cause to be
served upon the respondent an order
requiring such respondent to cease and desist
from such discriminatory or unfair practice
and to take such action as it may order” in
accordance with the provisions of CADA.

CHIEF JUDGE
BERGER concur.
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“A baker refused to make a cake for a gay couple due to religious
beliefs. Supreme Court will rule on the case in fall”
The Los Angeles Times
David G. Savage
June 26, 2017

The Supreme Court said Monday that it
would hear a major religious liberties case
that could grant new freedoms to businesses
to discriminate against gays and lesbians —
and potentially others — based on the faith of
the owners.

The case, to be heard in the fall, could have a
wide effect in states like California that
prohibit discrimination against people based
on their sexual orientation.
No federal law requires businesses to serve
all customers without regard to their sexual
orientation, but 21 states have “public
accommodations” laws that prohibit
discrimination against gays and lesbians.

The case involves the Christian owner of a
Colorado bakery who refused to make a
wedding cake for a same-sex couple.
The high-profile dispute pits the rights of
religious individuals against gay rights, two
issues that have been at the forefront of
several recent Supreme Court decisions. Both
are high priorities for Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, whose vote in this matter will
probably be key.

States with such anti-discrimination laws are
mostly in the West, East Coast and upper
Midwest. No state in the South or on the
Great Plains has such a law.
Supreme Court won't hear a California gun
case, leaving in place the state's strict limits
on concealed weapons

In the past, Kennedy has been both a strong
supporter of gay rights and a defender of
religious liberty.

Colorado is one of the states whose laws
protect gay couples, and Jack Phillips, the
owner of the Masterpiece Cakeshop in
Lakewood, Colo., was charged with violating
it.

The Colorado case is likely to become one of
the court’s most contentious cases next term.
It could decide whether business owners are
allowed to cite their religious views as a
reason for refusing to serve gay and lesbian
couples. Potentially, it could sweep even
more broadly, opening a religious exemption
to civil rights laws that could allow
discrimination against other groups.

In 2012, he said he politely declined to make
a wedding cake for Charles Craig and David
Mullins, who had planned to marry in
Massachusetts but then have a reception in
their home state of Colorado. They lodged a
complaint with the state civil rights
commission.
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The commission ruled that Phillips’ refusal to
make the wedding cake violated the
provision in the state’s anti-discrimination
law that says businesses open to the public
may not deny service to customers based on
their race, religion, gender or sexual
orientation. The panel ordered him to provide
wedding cakes on an equal basis for same-sex
couples.

valid basis for denying service to certain
customers.
“This has always been about more than a
cake,” Mullins said in a statement.
“Businesses should not be allowed to violate
the law and discriminate against us because
of who we are and who we love.”
James Esseks, director of the ACLU’s LGBT
Project said the “law is squarely on David and
Charlie’s side because when businesses are
open to the public, they’re supposed to be
open to everyone.”

Phillips appealed to the Supreme Court,
arguing he deserved a religious exemption
based on the 1st Amendment’s guarantee of
freedom of speech and free exercise of
religion. His lawyers say he refused to
comply with the commission ruling while his
appeal proceeded.

But Justice Kennedy, who wrote the court’s
opinion upholding same-sex marriages, has
also joined the court’s conservatives in
upholding religious exemptions. He joined
the 5-4 majority in the Hobby Lobby case,
which said the Christian family who owned a
chain of craft stores could refuse to provide
their employees the full range of
contraceptives called for by the federal
healthcare law.

They described Phillips as a “cake artist” who
will “not create cakes celebrating any
marriage that is contrary to his understanding
of biblical teaching.”
They also said he has refused to make cakes
to celebrate Halloween or create baked goods
that have “anti-American or anti-family
themes” or carry profane messages.

Public opinion polls show that most
Americans support the rights of same-sex
couples to marry and that support has steadily
increased, even among groups who have been
opposed in the past, notably evangelical
Christians.

“They said you have to create cakes for samesex couples, so he removed himself from the
market. He chose to stop making wedding
cakes,” said Jeremy Tedesco, a lawyer for the
Alliance Defending Freedom, who appealed
on Phillips’ behalf.

Advocates on the Christian right, however,
say the government should not force
believers to endorse marriages that conflict
with their faith.

Lawyers for the state commission and the
American Civil Liberties Union urged the
court to turn down the appeal in Masterpiece
Cakeshop vs. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission. They said it could open a
“gaping hole” in civil rights laws if business
owners could cite their religious beliefs as a

Two years ago, the justices turned down a
similar appeal from a wedding photographer
in New Mexico. Since then, the issue has
arisen in several other states whose laws
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forbid discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
The appeal in the Colorado case has been
pending since January, suggesting the
justices were closely split on what to do.
Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, a Colorado native
and a well-known defender of religious
liberty claims, joined the court in April.
It takes only four votes to hear the case, and
on the last day before the summer recess, the
justices announced they would hear the issue
during the fall.
Separately Monday, the court in a 6-3 ruling
struck down an Arkansas law regarding birth
certificates that prevented adding the names
of both parents in a same-sex union. The law
called for including only the biological
parent.
The court, in an unsigned opinion, said this
rule denied the same-sex couple the same
rights as opposite-sex couples and was
therefore unconstitutional.
The court noted that in Arkansas if an
opposite-sex
couple
used
artificial
insemination with an anonymous sperm
donor to have a child, the mother’s husband
in such a case would be listed on the birth
certificate.
Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel A. Alito
Jr. and Gorsuch dissented in that case, Pavan
vs. Smith.
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“A Supreme Court mystery: Has Roberts embraced same-sex marriage
ruling?”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes
July 16, 2017

A Supreme Court mystery: Has Chief Justice
John G. Roberts Jr. embraced the court’s
same-sex marriage decision that he so
passionately protested two years ago?

Kennedy and proprietor of the legal blog
Take Care.
And one of the times they don’t is when
issuing a “per curiam” decision, an unsigned
opinion that is filed on behalf of the court.

The “does-he-doesn’t-he” question is
prompted by a case that the court decided
without oral arguments at the end of the
recently completed term. The justices ruled in
favor of same-sex couples, but did so in a way
that has turned those who closely follow the
court’s actions into a debating society.

In Pavan v. Smith , the court summarily
overruled a decision of the Arkansas
Supreme Court and agreed with same-sex
married couples who said the state treated
them differently than heterosexual married
couples when issuing birth certificates. The
state automatically listed spouses of mothers
on birth certificates when the spouse was a
man, but not when she was a woman.

And the answer could be important for more
than curiosity’s sake. The court has accepted
for its next term a case dealing with whether
business owners must provide services for
same-sex unions even if they are religiously
opposed, and the nation’s courts are filling
with cases about how far the 2015 same-sex
marriage ruling extends.

The per curiam decision said that Arkansas’s
justices had failed to properly apply the
court’s landmark decision that same-sex
couples have a constitutional right to marry,
Obergefell v. Hodges.

Usually, there is no question about where the
justices stand. One of the Supreme Court’s
boasts about its transparency is that justices
put their names on their work, joining the
reasoning of a majority or dissenting opinion
or writing their own.

“Differential treatment infringes Obergefell’s
commitment to provide same-sex couples
‘the constellation of benefits that the states
have linked to marriage,’ ” the unsigned
opinion said.
The court’s three most conservative justices
objected. Justices Clarence Thomas and
Samuel A. Alito Jr. joined a dissent written
by Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, which said the

“Except sometimes they don’t,” said Joshua
Matz, a former clerk to Justice Anthony M.
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Yes, Roberts was in the majority.

court should have accepted the case for full
briefing and argument because the outcome
wasn’t nearly as clear-cut as the majority
claimed.

When there is a published opinion and a
justice does not note being in dissent, said
Kozinski (yet another person who used to call
Kennedy boss), the justice has signed on to
the majority.

“Nothing in Obergefell spoke (let alone
clearly) to the question” raised in the
Arkansas
case,
Gorsuch
wrote.
(Parenthetically, the parenthetical in that line
has been interpreted by some as a shot at
Kennedy, who wrote the Obergefell ruling
and for whom Gorsuch clerked on the
Supreme Court.

“No doubt about it,” Kozinski said.
Will Baude, a University of Chicago law
professor and former Roberts clerk who has
closely studied the per curiam decisions,
rulings on emergency filings and stay
requests that collectively have been referred
to as the court’s “shadow docket,” is
skeptical of Kozinski’s pronouncement.

Noticeably absent from the dissent was
Roberts, who was on the losing side in
Obergefell. He issued a strongly worded
dissent and underlined his opposition by
reading a summary of it from the bench —
the first and only time he has taken such a
step in more than a decade on the court.

“We don’t know for sure, but I think he’s
probably wrong,” Baude said.
Baude said it is clear that justices do not
always note their dissents when it comes to
dealing with emergency stay applications, for
instance. And he said it seems likely that
there are times when justices simply don’t
note their dissents.

Same-sex couples are justified in celebrating
their newly found right, he said, but he added
tartly that “the Constitution has nothing to do
with it.”
But if Roberts wasn’t with the named
dissenters in the recent Arkansas case, does
that mean he was with the unnamed majority?

Matz titled his commentary “No, the Chief
Justice Did Not Just Embrace Obergefell”
and said there could be several reasons for a
justice to secretly dissent: “For instance, to
conceal one’s views from the public and
thereby retain future flexibility; as a display
of good will to the majority or the institution
as a whole; or to avoid needlessly creating the
appearance of conflict.”

Constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky
said during a recent panel discussion at the
University of California at Irvine Law School
that the answer was yes and the vote should
be seen as 6 to 3.
Law professor Leah Litman said she wasn’t
sure Chemerinsky could make such a claim.
But another panelist, Alex Kozinski, the
celebrated and conservative longtime judge
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th
Circuit, was definitive:

Perhaps Roberts didn’t like Gorsuch’s
dissent. Perhaps the chief thought the
Arkansas case not worth taking.
Because the five members of the Obergefell
majority — Kennedy and Justices Ruth
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Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan — remain,
Roberts certainly knows there is no way of
dislodging Obergefell as precedent, and
perhaps he thought it covered the Arkansas
case, whether he liked it or not.
Kozinski said during the University of
California at Irvine panel that judges know
when they are outnumbered and it is not
worth taking up a case you are sure to lose.
“It’s a matter of arithmetic,” he said.
But it doesn’t dictate what a judge might do
in the next case, he said, if circumstances —
for instance, the court’s membership —
change.
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“Gay Rights Groups Seek One More Win From Justice Kennedy”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
July 17, 2017

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the greatest
judicial champion of gay rights in the
nation’s history, will turn 81 on Sunday.
Rumors that he would retire in June turned
out to be wrong, but he will not be on the
Supreme Court forever.

federal law protecting against sexualorientation discrimination in employment or
housing
or
education
or
public
accommodations,” Professor Cohen said.
“Only about 20 states offer protection under
their own state laws.”

Gay rights groups hope to score one more
victory before he leaves the court. The goal
this time is nationwide protection against
employment discrimination.

This month, the gay rights group Lambda
Legal announced that it would ask the
Supreme Court to hear a case that could
prohibit employers from discriminating
against gay and lesbian workers. The group
argues that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibits workplace
discrimination based on sex, also bans
discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinions
in all four of the court’s landmark gay rights
rulings, culminating in the 2015 decision
establishing a constitutional right to same-sex
marriage. But there is more work to be done,
said Suzanne B. Goldberg, a law professor at
Columbia.

Most federal appeals courts have rejected the
theory. But in April, by an 8-to-3 vote, the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, in Chicago, said Title VII
covered gay people. “It would require
considerable calisthenics to remove the ‘sex’
from ‘sexual orientation,’” Chief Judge
Diane Wood wrote for the majority.

“Marriage equality did not bring an end to
sexual-orientation discrimination in this
country,” she said.
The same-sex marriage decision left gay men
and lesbians in a strange position, said David
S. Cohen, a law professor at Drexel
University.

She relied on the language and logic of Title
VII, and on Supreme Court precedents.

“You can get married, put a picture on your
desk from the wedding and then be fired
because the boss sees the picture,” he said.

In 1989, for instance, the Supreme Court said
discrimination against workers because they
did not conform to gender stereotypes was a
form of sex discrimination. Being a lesbian,
Judge Wood wrote, “represents the ultimate

“Marriage was certainly an important step,
but it doesn’t change the fact that there is no
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case of failure to conform to the female
stereotype (at least as understood in a place
such as modern America, which views
heterosexuality as the norm and other forms
of sexuality as exceptional).”

Gregory R. Nevins, a lawyer with Lambda
Legal who represents Ms. Evans, chose his
words carefully in discussing whether the
odds of winning at the Supreme Court would
dim if Justice Kennedy retired.

In dissent, Judge Diane S. Sykes said the
majority
had
overreached.
“It’s
understandable that the court is impatient to
protect lesbians and gay men from workplace
discrimination without waiting for Congress
to act,” she wrote. “Legislative change is
arduous and can be slow to come. But we’re
not authorized to amend Title VII by
interpretation.”

“We think we have good reasons for
optimism with the current composition of the
court,” he said. “You always want the setup
that you feel comfortable with, rather than
any variation of it.”
“Justice Kennedy has viewed the
mistreatment of lesbian, gay and bisexual
individuals with a jaundiced eye,” Mr. Nevis
added.

The Seventh Circuit’s ruling in April created
a split among the federal appeals courts, and
such disagreements often prompt the
Supreme Court to step in. But the defendant
in the case, an Indiana community college,
quickly announced that it would not appeal.

Legal scholars were more direct. “Kennedy is
more sympathetic to gay rights than his
replacement is likely to be,” said Andrew M.
Koppelman, a law professor at Northwestern
who wrote a 1994 law review article called
“Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and
Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination.”

Legal experts said it was only a matter of time
until the Supreme Court addressed the issue.

Professor Cohen, who agreed that Title VII
should be read to cover sexual-orientation
discrimination, said there was reason for gay
rights groups to move quickly. “Certainly
anything trying to protect people from
discrimination in any form is going to fare
better with Justice Kennedy on the court than
with another Trump appointee,” he said,
“although I certainly don’t think it’s a slam
dunk with Justice Kennedy.”

“The odds that the Supreme Court grants
review of this question in the near future are
high,” Joshua Matz wrote in April on Take
Care, a legal blog. “It is no exaggeration to
say that Title VII’s application to gays and
lesbians now ranks among the most
important open questions in U.S. civil rights
law.”
The next case is now on the horizon. It
concerns Jameka Evans, who says a Georgia
hospital discriminated against her because
she is a lesbian. In March, a divided threejudge panel of the 11th Circuit, in Atlanta,
ruled that Title VII did not cover
discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Justice Kennedy has never embraced the
theory that sexual-orientation discrimination
is a form of sex discrimination. But he
seemed intrigued by the question in 2013
when the Supreme Court heard arguments
about Proposition 8, a referendum that
banned same-sex marriage in California.
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“Do you believe this can be treated as a
gender-based
classification?”
Justice
Kennedy asked a lawyer defending the ban.
He did not wait for an answer. “It’s a difficult
question,” Justice Kennedy said. “I’ve been
trying to wrestle with it.”
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“Court Rules Baker Can’t Refuse to Make Wedding Cake for Gay
Couple”
The Wall Street Journal
Jacob Gershman and Tamara Audi
August 13, 2015

A Colorado appeals court on Thursday ruled
that a Denver-area baker cannot refuse to
make a wedding cake for a gay couple based
on his religious belief.

Religious conservatives said the ruling was a
mistake. Lawyers for the bakery said they
would consider appealing.
“Government has a duty to protect people’s
freedom to follow their beliefs personally and
professionally rather than force them to adopt
the government’s views,” said Jeremy
Tedesco, senior counsel for Alliance
Defending Freedom, who argued the
Colorado case.

The
decision
comes
as
religious
conservatives opposed to gay marriage fight
to carve out exemptions to same-sex
marriage and antidiscrimination laws—
especially in the wake of the U.S. Supreme
Court ruling earlier this year legalizing samesex marriage nationwide.

The dispute started in 2012, when Charlie
Craig and David Mullins visited Masterpiece
Cakeshop in Lakewood and requested a cake
to celebrate their planned wedding. The
couple had plans to marry in Massachusetts
but wanted to celebrate with their friends in
Colorado, which at the time didn’t permit
same-sex marriages.

The Colorado Court of Appeals rejected the
argument by lawyers for the cake-shop owner
who argued that forcing him to create and sell
a cake to a gay couple planning a wedding
celebration violated his First Amendment
rights.
The ruling is the latest to limit the rights of
religious business owners involved in
wedding services to turn away same-sex
couples.

Masterpiece owner Jack Phillips declined the
couple’s request, telling them he didn’t create
wedding cakes for same-sex weddings
because of his religious beliefs, according to
the opinion, which said he advised the two
men that he would be happy to sell them other
baked goods.

“There’s a growing body of court decisions
saying that while religion is central to what
makes America America, religion can’t be
used as an excuse to discriminate,” said
James Esseks, the director of the American
Civil Liberties Union LGBT project. The
ACLU represented the couple in the case.

“Phillips believes that decorating cakes is a
form of art, that he can honor God through his
artistic talents, and that he would displease
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God by creating cakes for same-sex
marriages,” the opinion said.

But civil-liberties groups say continuing legal
fights aren’t indicative of a larger cultural
battle.

The couple then filed a complaint with the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, alleging
discrimination based on sexual orientation
under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.
After a commission judge ruled for the
couple—a decision affirmed by the
commission itself—Mr. Phillips took his case
to the appellate court.

“There’s a small number of conflicts and the
courts are resolving them the same way every
time,” the ACLU’s Mr. Esseks said.
Gay couples have won similar cases in other
states. In 2013, the highest court in New
Mexico ruled that the owners of an
Albuquerque
wedding-photography
company can’t deny services to same-sex
couples.

“Masterpiece does not convey a message
supporting same-sex marriages merely by
abiding by the law and serving its customers
equally,” the court said in its ruling Thursday.

Earlier this summer, the Oregon labor
commissioner ordered the owners of
“Sweetcakes by Melissa” bakery to pay a
lesbian couple $135,000 in damages “for
emotional and mental suffering resulting
from” its refusal to bake them a wedding
cake.

Religious conservatives opposed to gay
marriage have tried to soften their rhetoric
about homosexuality and their approach to
the LGBT community, while maintaining
their opposition to same-sex marriage.
Some church leaders fear the Supreme Court
ruling could result in discrimination against
religious people, and have said they would
continue to fight for exemptions for business
owners
and
religiously
affiliated
organizations.
“What happens next is that states should
respond with appropriate legislation that
would prevent the government from
penalizing or coercing anyone because they
act on the belief that marriage is a union
between one man and one woman,” said
Roger Severino, the director of the DeVos
Center for Religion and Civil Society at the
Heritage Foundation, a conservative think
tank.
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“Colorado baker wants U.S. Supreme Court to hear gay wedding cake
case”
The Denver Post
Yesenia Robles
July 22, 2016

Masterpiece Cakeshop owner Jack Phillips is
now asking the U.S. Supreme Court to hear
his case after a lower court ruled he was
wrong in refusing to make a wedding cake for
a same-sex couple by citing his religious
beliefs.

excuse to discriminate against prospective
customers.”
In 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins
were turned away by Phillips when they
requested a custom wedding cake. Mullins
and Craig planned to marry in Massachusetts
and wanted a cake to celebrate in Colorado.
Phillips refused, citing his religious beliefs.

His attorneys filed the petition Friday.
“No one — not Jack or anyone else — should
be forced by the government to further a
message that they cannot in good conscience
promote,” said attorney Jeremy Tedesco in a
statement released by the non-profit legal
organization Alliance Defending Freedom.
“And that’s what this case is about.”

In December 2013, administrative law Judge
Robert N. Spencer said offering the same
services to gay couples as heterosexual
couples did not violate Phillips’ rights to free
speech and does not prevent him from
exercising his religious freedom.

Last month the Colorado Supreme Court
decided it would not hear the case of the
Lakewood baker.

The appeals courts later upheld that ruling,
stating that the Colorado Anti-Discrimination
Act does not compel the cake shop owner to
endorse any religious views. Instead, it
prohibits Phillips from discriminating against
customers based on sexual orientation.

Mark Silverstein, the legal director for
American Civil Liberties Unit of Colorado,
said the organization intends to file a
response to the petition.

Tedesco said Friday afternoon that many
similar cases are circulating the lower courts
throughout the country.

“As we’ve argued and the courts have
consistently and correctly ruled in this case,
everyone has a right to their religious
beliefs,” Silverstein said. “But business
owners cannot rely on those beliefs as an

Tedesco said the only similar case that the
U.S. Supreme Court has been asked to hear is
one about a photographer in New Mexico
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who refused to photograph a gay couple. The
court did not take up that case, but Tedesco
said that wasn’t a surprise.
“Our view is it’s only a matter of time before
the Supreme Court takes one of these cases,”
Tedesco said. “It’s a really crucial issue of
First Amendment law.
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“Opinion: The sleeper issue in the 'gay wedding cake' controversy”
Los Angeles Times
Michael McGough
August 17, 2015

Social conservatives have rallied behind
bakers and photographers who don’t want to
provide services for same-sex weddings. But
the courts continue to be unsympathetic. The
latest rebuff was a decision last week by the
Colorado Court of Appeals in the case of Jack
C. Phillips, a Christian baker who refused to
create a wedding cake for a gay couple who
planned to marry in Massachusetts but
celebrate their union in Colorado.

basis of their sexual orientation. The court
ruled that “the act of same-sex marriage is
closely correlated to Craig’s and Mullins’
sexual
orientation.”
Therefore,
an
administrative law judge hadn't erred in
concluding that Phillips’ refusal to bake the
cake was “because of” the couple’s sexual
orientation.
The appeals court backed that conclusion
with a citation from a 2010 U.S. Supreme
Court decision. That case concerned a
Christian group at the UC Hastings College
of Law that required its leaders to affirm, and
live by, the traditional view that sex is
permissible only within heterosexual
marriage.

The court’s opinion rejects arguments that
forcing Phillips to supply a cake to Charlie
Craig and David Mullins violated Phillips’
freedom of religion or his 1st Amendment
right against being compelled to convey a
“celebratory” message he doesn’t believe in.
But to reach those questions, the court had to
reject another legal claim by Phillips that
hasn’t received enough attention: that in
refusing to provide the cake, he wasn’t
engaging in anti-gay discrimination. Phillips
noted that he was happy to provide Craig and
Mullins with other baked goods. (Less
persuasively, he floated the idea that
heterosexual couples might also enter into a
same-sex marriage.)

The law school had refused to recognize the
Christian Legal Society chapter because, it
said, the group was in violation of a policy
that membership and leadership positions in
such groups must be open to “all comers.”
Student groups, couldn’t discriminate on the
basis of “race, color, religion, national origin,
ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual
orientation.”
The Christian group argued that it excluded
some students not because of their sexual
orientation, but rather “on the basis of a
conjunction of conduct and the belief that the
conduct is not wrong.” In other words,

The appeals court was quick -- maybe too
quick -- to accept the idea that refusal to bake
a cake for a same-sex wedding is tantamount
to discriminating against customers on the
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celibate gays who endorsed the group’s
Christian moral theology were welcome
despite their sexual orientation.

That leaves arguments based on freedom of
religion or freedom of speech, but those don’t
seem very promising either. A New Mexico
wedding photographer who refused to take
pictures of a same-sex celebration appealed a
decision against her to the U.S. Supreme
Court; last year the justices refused even to
hear the case.

Writing for the court, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg rejected that argument, noting that
in gay rights cases, the court had “declined to
distinguish between status and conduct.”
To a lot of gay rights supporters, it’s selfevident that a refusal to bake a cake for a
same-sex wedding is discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. But there are
people, such as Phillips and the bishops of the
Roman Catholic Church, who insist on a
distinction between sexual orientation and
sexual activity or participation in a same-sex
marriage.
And here’s another question raised by David
French in the National Review: If
discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is interpreted in broad terms,
would a similarly broad definition of racial
discrimination require a baker to provide a
Confederate-flag cake for a white
supremacist group lest he be accused of bias
against whites? (Phillips said he also objected
to baking cakes that incorporate racist
symbols.)
The decision in the Christian Legal Society
case was 5 to 4. (One justice in the majority,
John Paul Stevens, has since retired, but his
successor, Elena Kagan, likely would rule the
same way.) So it seems that bakers, wedding
photographers and other merchants who live
in jurisdictions that prohibit discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation won’t be
able to argue that “we’re not anti-gay, we’re
just anti-gay-marriage.”

48

“Cake-bakers have the right to draw a line in the icing”
The New York Post
David Harsanyi
June 30, 2017

This week, the Supreme Court agreed to hear
the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop owner
Jack Phillips, the man who refused to create
a specialty wedding cake for a same-sex
couple in Colorado in 2012. Yet the stories
that dominate coverage distort the public’s
understanding of the case and its serious
implications.

As is The New York Times headline
“Justices to Hear Case on Baker’s Refusal to
Serve Gay Couple,” which was later changed
to the even worse headline “Justices to Hear
Case on Religious Objections to Same-Sex
Marriage.”
A person with only passing interest in this
case might be led to believe that Phillips is
fighting to hang a “No Gays Allowed” sign
in his shop. In truth, he never refused to serve
a gay couple. He didn’t even really refuse to
sell David Mullins and Charlie Craig a
wedding cake.

For one thing, no matter how many times
people repeat it, the case isn’t about
discrimination or challenging gay marriage.
But when the news first broke, USA Today,
for example, tweeted, “The Supreme Court
has agreed to reopen the national debate over
same-sex marriage.”

Everything in his shop was available to gays
and straights and anyone else who walked in
his door.

The headline (and story) on the Web site was
worse; it read, “Supreme Court will hear
religious liberty challenge to gay weddings.”
Others similarly framed the case.

What Phillips did was refuse to use his skills
to design and bake a unique cake for a gay
wedding.

There is an impulse to frame every issue as a
clash between the tolerant and the closedminded. But the Masterpiece case doesn’t
challenge, undermine or relitigate the issue of
same-sex marriage. Gay marriage wasn’t
even legal in Colorado when this incident
occurred.

Like many other
bakers,
florists,
photographers and musicians — and millions
of other Christians — Phillips holds genuine
longstanding religious convictions. If
Mullins and Craig had demanded that
Phillips create an erotic-themed cake, the
baker would have similarly refused for
religious reasons, just as he had with other
customers.

So, The Associated Press’ headline,
“Supreme Court to Decide If Baker Can
Refuse Gay Couple Wedding Cake,” and
story are also wrong.
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If a couple had asked him to design a
specialty cake that read “Congrats on the
abortion, Jenny!” I’m certain he would have
refused them as well, even though abortions
are legal. It’s not the people; it’s the message.

because of the players involved but also
because they don’t understand the facts.
In this era of identity politics, some have been
programmed to reflexively side with the
person making accusations of status-based
discrimination, all in an effort to empower
the state to coerce a minority of people to see
the world their way.

In its tortured decision, the Colorado Court of
Appeals admitted as much, contending that
while Phillips didn’t overtly discriminate
against the couple, “the act of same-sex
marriage is closely correlated to Craig’s and
Mullins’ sexual orientation,” so it could
divine his real intentions.

Well, not all people. In 2014, a Christian
activist named William Jack went to a
Colorado bakery and requested two cakes in
the shape of a Bible, one to be decorated with
the Bible verses “God hates sin. Psalm 45:7”
and “Homosexuality is a detestable sin.
Leviticus 18:22,” and the other cake to be
decorated with another passage.

In other words, the threshold for denying
religious liberty and free expression is the
presence of advocacy or a political opinion
that conflates with faith. The court has
effectively tasked itself with determining
when religion is allowed to matter to you.

The bakery refused. Even though Christians
are a protected group, the Colorado Civil
Rights Division threw out the case.

Or, in other words, if SCOTUS upholds the
lower-court ruling, it will empower unelected
civil-rights commissions — which are
typically stacked with hard-left authoritarians
— to decide when your religious actions are
appropriate.

The American Civil Liberties Union called
the passages “obscenities.” I guess the Bible
doesn’t “correlate” closely enough with a
Christian’s identity.
Or perhaps we’ve finally established a state
religion: It’s run on the dogma of “social
justice.”

How could any honest person believe this
was the Constitution’s intent? There was a
time, I’m told, when the state wouldn’t
substantially burden religious exercise and
would use the least restrictive means to
further compelling interests. Today, the state
can substantially burden a Christian because
he has hurt the wrong person’s feelings.
Judging from the e-mails and social-media
reactions I’ve gotten regarding this case,
people are not only instinctively antagonistic
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“Using ‘free speech’ as a cover for discrimination”
Boston Globe
July 6, 2017

Colorado cake maker Jack Phillips is devout
about his artistry in icing and fondant. He’s
also devout about his Christian faith, so much
so that he believes it would be deeply sinful
to prepare a wedding cake for a same-sex
couple. Last week, the US Supreme Court
agreed to hear his case, and arguments in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado
Civil Rights Commission — one in a series
of efforts to fence in the galloping acceptance
of same-sex marriage — could come as soon
as this fall.

and codified by the Supreme Court in 2015:
the right to same-sex marriage.
Historically, courts have tried to strike an
equitable balance between expanded civil
rights and religious expression. Since the
Civil Rights Act was enacted, in 1964,
lawmakers and the courts have allowed some
exemptions but have tended to draw the line
when claims of religious freedom are used to
justify discrimination. As James Esseks,
director of the ACLU LGBT project put it:
“You have freedom to believe and to preach
your faith, until your actions harm other
people.”

Events were set in motion in 2012, when
David Mullins and Charlie Craig, who
planned to marry in Massachusetts, stopped
into Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood,
Colo., to order a wedding cake. Phillips
refused to serve them, even though Colorado
law says businesses open to the public can’t
discriminate based on sexual orientation.

The Supreme Court’s Obergefell v. Hodges
decision two years ago was transformative,
addressing vital claims to liberty and dignity
for millions of gay Americans. Phillips’s
protest also comes at a time when national
support for same-sex marriage is at an alltime high, according to a recent Pew
Research Center poll. A majority of
Americans surveyed — 62 percent — now
support gay marriage, including two-thirds of
Catholics and 68 percent of mainline
Protestants. And while white evangelical
Christians aren’t exactly waving rainbow
flags, support for same-sex marriage has
grown from 27 percent in 2016 to 35 percent
today, according to Pew.

Phillips, of course, has a constitutionally
protected First Amendment right to profess
his faith. And he’s made it clear there’s no
room for compromise, telling The New York
Times: “I believe that the Bible teaches that
homosexuality is wrong, and that to
participate in a sin is wrong for me. For me to
take part in it against my will is compelling
me to make a statement that I don’t want to
make.” But there’s another right hanging in
the balance, rooted in the 14th Amendment
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There’s a broader First Amendment principle
at stake, however. The Phillips case is
another alarming assault on freedom of
speech, part of an effort by businesses large
and small to turn that most essential
constitutional right into an antiregulatory
tool. This “compelled speech” doctrine is
already making its way through Congress and
the court system, most notably in a case
involving business groups fighting a 2010
law that requires them to disclose whether
their products contain minerals linked to
warlords in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. In June, the US House passed the
Financial CHOICE Act, which includes a
pro-business provision to repeal the conflictmineral disclosure. The US Senate should
reject the bill, which also rolls back DoddFrank reforms. And the Supreme Court
justices should recognize that the
Masterpiece Cakeshop case is not about
forcing speech, but about banning
discriminatory conduct. The Colorado
cakemaker should be free to worship as he
pleases, but not to abrogate settled civil rights
law under the guise of the First Amendment.
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